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utsfl:classroom:seminars:pba305y [2016/10/14 09:10] – balleyne | utsfl:classroom:seminars:pba305y [2018/11/15 14:54] – mmccann | ||
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- | ====== PBA305H: | + | ====== PBA305H: |
- | FIXME Refactor this in terms of two core components | + | There are four main ways in which abortion advocates will argue: |
- | FIXME David Boonin' | + | - Abortion can be justifiable due to the circumstances of a crisis pregnancy |
+ | - Abortion is justifiable because the pre-born are not human | ||
+ | - Abortion is justifiable because the pre-born are not persons | ||
+ | - Abortion is justifiable even if the pre-born are persons, because of bodily autonomy | ||
+ | |||
+ | Peter Singer' | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | {{youtube> | ||
- | Most abortion advocates deny the humanity of the pre-born to justify abortion. Peter Singer instead argues that it can be justifiable to kill innocent pre-born (or newborn) human beings because they are not persons((http:// | + | He argues that the moral question for abortion should be based on a utilitarian calculation which compares the preferences of a woman against the preferences of the fetus -- and does not consider a fetus or newborn of having many, if any, serious interests.(([[wp> |
+ | ===== Background ===== | ||
+ | ==== Preference Utilitarianism ==== | ||
+ | FIXME definitions!! | ||
===== Against Speciesism and the Sanctity of Human Life ===== | ===== Against Speciesism and the Sanctity of Human Life ===== | ||
+ | ==== Rejecting Other Pro-Choice Arguments ==== | ||
Three primary texts: | Three primary texts: | ||
- Singer, Peter. // | - Singer, Peter. // | ||
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* Singer rejects the theory of rights behind it (p. 148), because as a utilitarian, | * Singer rejects the theory of rights behind it (p. 148), because as a utilitarian, | ||
* But he believes the argument is valid, and could be defended if her theory of rights can be defended | * But he believes the argument is valid, and could be defended if her theory of rights can be defended | ||
+ | |||
+ | ==== Personhood Argument ==== | ||
* Singer' | * Singer' | ||
* All (most?) of the liberal arguments accepted the //sanctity of human life//, but Singer rejects that (. 150) | * All (most?) of the liberal arguments accepted the //sanctity of human life//, but Singer rejects that (. 150) | ||
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- http:// | - http:// | ||
- | ==== Themes ==== | ||
=== Rejects the Sanctity of Human Life === | === Rejects the Sanctity of Human Life === | ||
> the fact that a being is human, and alive, does not in itself tell us whether it is wrong to take that being' | > the fact that a being is human, and alive, does not in itself tell us whether it is wrong to take that being' | ||
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FIXME | FIXME | ||
- | === Counterintuitive === | + | Preference Utilitarianism |
- | * Apply it to people that we know: Peter Singer could not apply his own worldview to his mother; he knows on a deeper, intuitive level that his worldview doesn' | + | |
=== Infanticide: | === Infanticide: | ||
===== Responses ===== | ===== Responses ===== | ||
+ | ==== Speciesism ==== | ||
+ | |||
+ | FIXME | ||
+ | |||
* First, we won't want to get in a worldview argument if we don't have to -- the animal rights question doesn' | * First, we won't want to get in a worldview argument if we don't have to -- the animal rights question doesn' | ||
+ | * EHP not OHP | ||
+ | |||
+ | < | ||
+ | {{: | ||
+ | "After talking to a Ryerson student about the science of when life begins, she agreed with me that pre-born human beings also deserve human rights. Then she asked, 'What about animal rights?' | ||
+ | |||
+ | </ | ||
+ | |||
* But, the utilitarian ethic is antithetical to the pro-life perspective and its adequacy needs a response (e.g. the problem of gang-rape, if we're similarly measuring overall pleasure against overall pain) | * But, the utilitarian ethic is antithetical to the pro-life perspective and its adequacy needs a response (e.g. the problem of gang-rape, if we're similarly measuring overall pleasure against overall pain) | ||
+ | |||
+ | === Counterintuitive === | ||
+ | * Apply it to people that we know: Peter Singer could not apply his own worldview to his mother; he knows on a deeper, intuitive level that his worldview doesn' | ||
+ | * Most people reject infanticide | ||
+ | |||
+ | === Functionalism vs. human essentialism === | ||
+ | * Inherent capacities (inherent rational nature) vs. current capacities | ||
+ | |||
+ | === Functionalism vs. human equality === | ||
+ | * Most people believe that all born humans are equal. What makes them equal? | ||
+ | * Steve Wagner: | ||
+ | * "It can’t be that all of us look human, because some have been disfigured. It can’t be that all of us have functional brains, because some are in reversible comas. It can’t be one’s ability to think or feel pain, for some think better than others and some don’t feel any pain. It can’t be something we can gain or lose, or something of which we can have more or less. If something like that grounds rights, equal rights don’t exist...There is only one quality we all have equally—we’re all human.” - Steve Wagner (quote= From Scott Klusendorf’s Case for life) | ||
+ | * Functionalism --> Ableism | ||
+ | * Kianna' | ||
===== Rough Notes ===== | ===== Rough Notes ===== | ||
FIXME mine Klusendorf' | FIXME mine Klusendorf' | ||
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Objections: | Objections: | ||
* According to Singer, the answer is no. “When we kill a newborn, there is no person whose life has begun. When I think of myself as the person I am now, I realize that I did not come into existence until sometime after my birth.”17 As Scott Rae and Paul Cox point out, however, “If I do not exist until sometime after my birth, in what sense is the birth mine? The only way for ‘my birth’ to be more than a linguistic convention is to admit that ‘I’ existed before I was born, or at least at the time of my birth.” | * According to Singer, the answer is no. “When we kill a newborn, there is no person whose life has begun. When I think of myself as the person I am now, I realize that I did not come into existence until sometime after my birth.”17 As Scott Rae and Paul Cox point out, however, “If I do not exist until sometime after my birth, in what sense is the birth mine? The only way for ‘my birth’ to be more than a linguistic convention is to admit that ‘I’ existed before I was born, or at least at the time of my birth.” | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===== Old Notes ===== | ||
+ | FIXME Refactor this in terms of two core components to the argument: (1) speciesism, (2) personhood (self-awareness, | ||
+ | FIXME David Boonin' |