Differences

This shows you the differences between two versions of the page.

Link to this comparison view

Both sides previous revisionPrevious revision
Next revision		Previous revision
Next revisionBoth sides next revision
utsfl:classroom:seminars:pba305y [2016/09/24 09:54] – balleyneutsfl:classroom:seminars:pba305y [2018/11/15 14:54] – mmccann
Line 1: Line 1:
-====== PBA305H: Sentience, Cortical Brain Activity, etc. -- Functionalism ====== +====== PBA305H: Peter Singer: Speciesism and Functionalism ====== 
-FIXME David Boonin's functionalism+There are four main ways in which abortion advocates will argue: 
 +  - Abortion can be justifiable due to the circumstances of a crisis pregnancy 
 +  - Abortion is justifiable because the pre-born are not human 
 +  - Abortion is justifiable because the pre-born are not persons 
 +  - Abortion is justifiable even if the pre-born are persons, because of bodily autonomy 
 +   
 +Peter Singer's influential defence of abortion argues that (1) it doesn't matter if the pre-born are human, because species membership is not relevant for moral consideration, and (2) even though the pre-born are human, they are not persons((http://www.utilitarianism.net/singer/by/1995----03.htm)), and therefore don't have moral status.
  
-Most abortion advocates deny the humanity of the pre-born to justify abortion. Peter Singer instead argues that it can be justifiable to kill innocent pre-born (or newborn) human beings because they are not persons((http://www.utilitarianism.net/singer/by/1995----03.htm)), and because he doesn't consider membership in a species to be morally relevant (comparing speciesism to racism or sexism). He argues that the moral question for abortion should be based on a utilitarian calculation which compares the preferences of a woman against the preferences of the fetus -- and does not consider a fetus or newborn of having many serious interests.(([[wp>Peter_Singer#Abortion.2C_euthanasia_and_infanticide|Peter Singer on Abortion]])) He agrees with pro-lifers that birth is not relevant, so he bites the bullet and says that infanticide isn't intrinsically wrong either -- the same argument used against the sanctity of pre-born human life applies against the sanctity of newborn human life. 
  
 +{{youtube>eCNz95E-3Wg?medium}}
 +
 +
 +He argues that the moral question for abortion should be based on a utilitarian calculation which compares the preferences of a woman against the preferences of the fetus -- and does not consider a fetus or newborn of having many, if any, serious interests.(([[wp>Peter_Singer#Abortion.2C_euthanasia_and_infanticide|Peter Singer on Abortion]])) He agrees with pro-lifers that birth is not relevant, so he bites the bullet and says that infanticide isn't intrinsically wrong either -- the same argument used against the sanctity of pre-born human life applies against the sanctity of newborn human life.
 +
 +===== Background =====
 +==== Preference Utilitarianism ====
 +FIXME definitions!!
  
 ===== Against Speciesism and the Sanctity of Human Life ===== ===== Against Speciesism and the Sanctity of Human Life =====
 +==== Rejecting Other Pro-Choice Arguments ====
 Three primary texts: Three primary texts:
   - Singer, Peter. //[[utlib>7457774|Practical Ethics]]// (Third Edition). New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.((See also: [[utlib>4081024|first edition]] (1979) and [[utlib>3303673|second edition]].))   - Singer, Peter. //[[utlib>7457774|Practical Ethics]]// (Third Edition). New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.((See also: [[utlib>4081024|first edition]] (1979) and [[utlib>3303673|second edition]].))
Line 22: Line 36:
               * Singer rejects the theory of rights behind it (p. 148), because as a utilitarian, consequences matter whereas Thompson considers rights independent of their consequences: "Therefore if the life of the fetus is given the same weight as the life of a normal person, the utilitarian would say that it would be wrong to refuse to carry the fetus until it can survive outside the womb." (p. 148)               * Singer rejects the theory of rights behind it (p. 148), because as a utilitarian, consequences matter whereas Thompson considers rights independent of their consequences: "Therefore if the life of the fetus is given the same weight as the life of a normal person, the utilitarian would say that it would be wrong to refuse to carry the fetus until it can survive outside the womb." (p. 148)
               * But he believes the argument is valid, and could be defended if her theory of rights can be defended               * But he believes the argument is valid, and could be defended if her theory of rights can be defended
 +
 +==== Personhood Argument ====
         * Singer's central [[wp>preference utilitarian]] argument for abortion, p. 149-152         * Singer's central [[wp>preference utilitarian]] argument for abortion, p. 149-152
           * All (most?) of the liberal arguments accepted the //sanctity of human life//, but Singer rejects that (. 150)           * All (most?) of the liberal arguments accepted the //sanctity of human life//, but Singer rejects that (. 150)
Line 46: Line 62:
   - http://www.princeton.edu/~psinger/faq.html   - http://www.princeton.edu/~psinger/faq.html
  
-==== Themes ==== 
 === Rejects the Sanctity of Human Life === === Rejects the Sanctity of Human Life ===
 > the fact that a being is human, and alive, does not in itself tell us whether it is wrong to take that being's life. //Rethinking Life and Death//, p. 105 > the fact that a being is human, and alive, does not in itself tell us whether it is wrong to take that being's life. //Rethinking Life and Death//, p. 105
Line 59: Line 74:
 FIXME FIXME
  
-=== Counterintuitive === +Preference Utilitarianism
-  * Apply it to people that we know: Peter Singer could not apply his own worldview to his mother; he knows on a deeper, intuitive level that his worldview doesn't work +
  
 === Infanticide: Euthanasia for disabled infants === === Infanticide: Euthanasia for disabled infants ===
  
 ===== Responses ===== ===== Responses =====
 +==== Speciesism ====
 +
 +FIXME
 +
   * First, we won't want to get in a worldview argument if we don't have to -- the animal rights question doesn't need resolution to get some basic agreement on human rights.   * First, we won't want to get in a worldview argument if we don't have to -- the animal rights question doesn't need resolution to get some basic agreement on human rights.
 +  * EHP not OHP
 +
 +<note> 
 +{{:utsfl:classroom:seminars:michelle_taa_2.jpg?300 |}}
 +"After talking to a Ryerson student about the science of when life begins, she agreed with me that pre-born human beings also deserve human rights. Then she asked, 'What about animal rights?' She shared with me that she’s an animal rights advocate. I replied, 'I agree that that’s also an important issue, but to be honest I’ve never given much thought about it and I eat meat. Maybe dogs deserve some rights. But does giving dogs some rights mean we should give less rights to some human beings? Can’t we agree that all members of the human family deserve fundamental human rights? If we did give dogs some rights, wouldn’t we give all members of the dog family that right?' She said that it made sense and I’ve given her something to think about. Then we thanked each other before she left to eat her lunch." - Michelle Caluag of [[http://www.torontoagainstabortion.org/|Toronto Against Abortion]]
 +
 +</note> 
 +
   * But, the utilitarian ethic is antithetical to the pro-life perspective and its adequacy needs a response (e.g. the problem of gang-rape, if we're similarly measuring overall pleasure against overall pain)   * But, the utilitarian ethic is antithetical to the pro-life perspective and its adequacy needs a response (e.g. the problem of gang-rape, if we're similarly measuring overall pleasure against overall pain)
 +
 +=== Counterintuitive ===
 +  * Apply it to people that we know: Peter Singer could not apply his own worldview to his mother; he knows on a deeper, intuitive level that his worldview doesn't work
 +  * Most people reject infanticide
 +
 +=== Functionalism vs. human essentialism ===
 +  * Inherent capacities (inherent rational nature) vs. current capacities
 +
 +=== Functionalism vs. human equality ===
 +  * Most people believe that all born humans are equal. What makes them equal?
 +    * Steve Wagner:
 +      * "It can’t be that all of us look human, because some have been disfigured. It can’t be that all of us have functional brains, because some are in reversible comas. It can’t be one’s ability to think or feel pain, for some think better than others and some don’t feel any pain. It can’t be something we can gain or lose, or something of which we can have more or less. If something like that grounds rights, equal rights don’t exist...There is only one quality we all have equally—we’re all human.” - Steve Wagner (quote= From Scott Klusendorf’s Case for life)
 +    * Functionalism --> Ableism
 +      * Kianna's testimony
 ===== Rough Notes ===== ===== Rough Notes =====
 FIXME mine Klusendorf's handling of this for primary source references (Lee, George, Mary Anne Warren, Jan Narveson, Peter Singer, etc.) -- may warrant separate seminars. http://prolifetraining.com/Articles/Five-Bad-Ways.htm FIXME mine Klusendorf's handling of this for primary source references (Lee, George, Mary Anne Warren, Jan Narveson, Peter Singer, etc.) -- may warrant separate seminars. http://prolifetraining.com/Articles/Five-Bad-Ways.htm
Line 98: Line 137:
 Objections: Objections:
   * According to Singer, the answer is no. “When we kill a newborn, there is no person whose life has begun. When I think of myself as the person I am now, I realize that I did not come into existence until sometime after my birth.”17 As Scott Rae and Paul Cox point out, however, “If I do not exist until sometime after my birth, in what sense is the birth mine? The only way for ‘my birth’ to be more than a linguistic convention is to admit that ‘I’ existed before I was born, or at least at the time of my birth.”   * According to Singer, the answer is no. “When we kill a newborn, there is no person whose life has begun. When I think of myself as the person I am now, I realize that I did not come into existence until sometime after my birth.”17 As Scott Rae and Paul Cox point out, however, “If I do not exist until sometime after my birth, in what sense is the birth mine? The only way for ‘my birth’ to be more than a linguistic convention is to admit that ‘I’ existed before I was born, or at least at the time of my birth.”
 +
 +===== Old Notes =====
 +FIXME Refactor this in terms of two core components to the argument: (1) speciesism, (2) personhood (self-awareness, etc. Kaczor 30-35)
 +FIXME David Boonin's functionalism, separate seminar?